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Challenges of economic development in Azerbaijan 
Namig Tagiyev and Elvin Afandi 
The economic performance of Azerbaijan is analyzed by separating three major economic development 
stages of the country but giving priority to the current period and its main principals. Besides, some important 
economic policy objectives of the government are listed too. 
After retrieving the independence of Azerbaijan, the transformation of political and socio-economic system - 
establishing an independent national economy that is based on democratic institutions and functioning 
market economy - became of a pivotal importance. Since then, the government has faced several important 
challenges such as the consolidation of independence; the establishment of a democratic, legal and secular 
state; the transition to market economy; the maintenance of territorial integrity of the country; the 
improvement of the population’s safety welfare.  
The economic development from the date of regaining independence until present days can be divided into 
three major stages. The first stage is the period of economic decline in 1991-1995. The second stage is the 
period of macroeconomic stabilization and dynamic growth in 1996-2004. The third, current stage has been 
characterized by significant socio-economic development since 2005.  
Economic decline 
In course of the first stage, negative tendencies were observed in case of all economic indicators. Among 
these, the decline of real GDP has to be strongly underlined, which was a result of the dramatic decrease of 
production volume in the country. In general, the collapse of the Soviet markets and unsystematic economic 
reforms implemented during 1991-1995 caused serious problems. The financial and banking system 
experienced paralysis. The budget deficit went up to 13% of GDP in 1994, and the whole deficit was 
financed by the National Bank through excessive increase of money supply. In 1992-1994, the emissions 
comprised 40-45% of money incomes of the population. In 1992-1994, the ratio of credit volume to GDP 
equaled to 55-60%. In 1994, interest rate of the National Bank amounted to 250%. The national currency 
which was introduced in 1992, started to depreciate soon and by 1995, the exchange rate depreciated 245 
times against the US dollar. The inflation in the country reached its peak during that period. In 1992-1994, 
the foreign trade turnover volume decreased by 42%. Up to 1994, there were no foreign investments in the 
country. During this period, the real money incomes of the population decreased drastically and the poverty 
level dramatically increased. 
Macroeconomic stability and dynamic growth 
Since 1995, Azerbaijan has obtained a number of achievements in socio-economic development and 
integration to world economy. However, the greatest achievement is the new Azerbaijani model that has 
been launched during the establishment of the independent state, in terms of economic reforms and 
development.  
During the second stage, as an official base for realizing the mentioned model, several large-scale policy 
documents (conception, strategy and programs) were adopted. Furthermore, the economic reforms with the 
frame of support from several financial institutions (especially the International Monetary Fund) were 
conducted through various programs.    
Here we should note that the strategic directions of the Azerbaijan model are built upon sustainable and 
dynamic development logics. This model’s main objectives are to form single socio-oriented economic 
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system – independent national economy that is built upon functioning market economy and self-development 
potential. It actively involves natural-economic, technical-production and scientific–technical potential, 
ensures efficient integration of national economy into world economy as well as the country’s accession to 
WTO. It maintains dynamic development and puts into practice the sustainable development model. 
The most illustrative proof of the viability and efficiency of the economic reforms were the achievements 
obtained in the socio-economic sphere in recent years.  The inflation was restrained, as the inflation level in 
Azerbaijan has never exceeded 2-3% since 1996, only in 2004, when it equaled to 6.7%. The practice of 
funding the budget deficit by the National Bank was dropped, and the budget deficit decreased to 1-2% of 
GDP. Thanks to these changes, the macroeconomic stability was achieved in 1996, and since 1997, it has 
become possible to ensure dynamic economic development, as after 1.3% real GDP growth rate in 1996 it 
reached 5.8% in 1997, and averaged around 10% between 1998 and 2004. 
Current development trajectory 
Most economists do not agree with that the independent Azerbaijan stepped into its third economic 
development phase in 2005. To prove this it is sufficient to provide the analysis of some macroeconomic 
indicators. 
Chart 1. Development of real GDP in 1990-2006 (at 1990 prices, %)  
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Source: State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, own calculations 
Having a look on Chart 1, real GDP growth has been negative in course of 1991-1995, and the economy has 
recovered in 1996. The volume of the real GDP produced in Azerbaijan reached the level of 1990 only in 
2005. The volume of real GDP in 2005 and 2006 exceeded the volume of the GDP produced in 1990 by 
18.2% and 59.3% respectively. 
One of the major reasons why the mentioned extreme growth in real GDP was achieved in 2005 and 2006 is 
related to the data of National Bank of Azerbaijan. The country realized annual real GDP growth of 26.4% 
and 34.5% respectively, which is considered as a world record that occurred thanks to the large-scale oil 
export to world market via Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. However, many experts are not in favor for such 
growth, reasoning their concerns by Dutch Disease, as a negative economic ailment caused by natural 
resource price increase and its negative effect on industrial and particularly on manufacturing development. 
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It is quite clear that in the recent period one of the main factors that speed up the economic growth in 
countries all over the world is the development of private sectors. This is the case in Azerbaijan, especially in 
connection with the third stage. 
Chart 2. Contribution of public and private sectors to GDP production 1995-2006 (% of GDP)  
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Source: State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2006: Azerbaijan in figures  
Chart 2 shows that the share of private sector in GDP production increased up to 76% in 2005 and it reached 
the record level, namely 81% in 2006. During the current stage, public property privatization and start of the 
implementation of the second privatization program launched at the end of the first stage, which allowed the 
privatization of enterprises of communication, transport, chemical industry, machine-building, fuel-energy 
complexes, also stimulated economic performance. 
On the other hand, we should mention the role of the National Fund on Support of Entrepreneurship that 
functions to realize the government’s support activity (support to private sector, production of import 
substitution products, manufacture of the products with export potential, innovation activity etc.).  
The role of huge oil revenues was important in achieving the record level of economic growth in recent years. 
The oil sector has started to experience a strong development period as a sub-sector of the industry.  It is 
possible to recognize on Chart 3 that in 2005 and 2006 the share of industry sector together with the oil 
sector in nominal GDP was very high and ran up to 47.5% and 58.3% respectively.  
All the mentioned facts show that the economic development of the country has already entered into a new 
stage of quality. The major objective of the current stage is to ensure the sustainability of dynamic socio-
economic development in the country in the long-term by achieving the improved competitiveness of the 
national economy and efficient integration to the world economy by shifting from a particularly oil sector 
driven growth to a manufacturing and services driven one.  
However, even at present, to achieve certain objectives ensuring and maintaining economic development 
sustainability in the Republic of Azerbaijan, the following necessary points has to be achieved with active 
participation of economic policy. 
The economic potential has to be defined and it should be realized in an integrated way. Priority has to be 
given to develop non-oil sectors such as manufacturing industry and services in order to strengthen 
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sustainability and economic diversification leaning on the opportunities coming from oil sector generated 
capital and development resources. 
Chart 3. Development of nominal GDP by sectors contribution 2000-2006 (%) 
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The conditions of business climate, the operating environment of entrepreneurship has to be improved by 
appropriate measures, which can have positive impact on employment and economic growth as well. The 
volume, the quality and the targeting of social services with the main objective of poverty reduction has to be 
achieved. Considerable efforts have to be made in order to improve the education level, especially 
concerning secondary and higher education. Finally yet importantly, the ecological balance and the 
environmental sustainability have to be seriously taken into consideration too. 
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Financial sector in Kyrgyzstan: heading toward banking sector 
penetration 
Samagan Aitymbetov 
At the early stage of transition, the acceleration of an economy is usually driven by robust real sector growth, 
which is generally financed by the informal financial sector. However, when the real sector reaches a certain 
point, the informal approach cannot continue to support further sustainable development. Private sector 
development needs formal financing channels and tools through banking sector or capital markets. For a 
relatively small economy like Kyrgyzstan, the banking sector is usually the first to drive this stage of growth. 
The next challenges for young financial sector of the republic are active banking sector penetration and 
facilitating financial access to small and medium enterprises. 
Investment Climate Statement of the Kyrgyz Republic, made by US State Department, describes Kyrgyzstan 
as largely a cash society, where outside investors have rarely sought financing from domestic banks. Bank 
lending is heavily biased towards short-term loans and traditionally does not favor the usage of physical 
assets as collateral. Some banks ignore retail banking, focusing rather on government bonds”.1 
Nevertheless, EBRD Transition Reports 2006 shows that there has been appreciable progress in banking 
sector reform in Kyrgyzstan evidenced by increased level of banking intermediation, albeit from very low 
level. Despite political uncertainty observable since March 2005, the banking sector grew rapidly, with total 
customer loans up around 60% per annum in real terms, in the last three years. Customer loans to GDP 
increased from 3% in 2003 to 10% in 2006.2 In recent years there has been a strong increase in foreign bank 
control as a number of Kazakh banks have established subsidiaries, bringing new technologies and 
enhancing competition. Furthermore, remittances have been identified as a potential catalyst for the financial 
deepening of Kyrgyzstan, as a recipient country through higher access to banking services by migrants' 
families. 
Contradictory deepening of the financial sector in Kyrgyzstan  
Recent data suggests that the macroeconomic and structural reforms pursued by transition countries have 
been successful in fostering financial sector development. Banking sector prevails in the financial system of 
the Kyrgyz Republic: 21 commercial banks operated in the Kyrgyz Republic as of 1 July 2007. The sector of 
non-banking institutions and micro crediting organizations - focusing mainly on agriculture and small 
businesses - is relatively developed compared to other CIS countries. Securities market and insurance 
business are at their primary development stage. 
The financial intermediation defined as the ratio of aggregate credit portfolio to gross domestic product 
(GDP) increased in comparison with similar period of the last year and was 15.1%. The marked growth in 
financial intermediation level is connected particularly with the growth in the loan portfolio of banking 
institutions in Kyrgyzstan. The growth rates of loans of the banking system and non-banking financial 
institutions were 21.5% and 10.3% respectively, which are still among the lowest ratios in Europe and 
Central Asia region. 
According to a study of the Swiss National Bank, between 1998 and 2005, the ratio of private credit to GDP 
increased from 31% to 46% in Central and Eastern Europe, from 18% to 28% in Southeast Europe and from 
8% to 19% in CIS countries. This substantial deepening of financial sectors in transition countries has been 
                                                 
1 2007 Investment Climate Statement – Kyrgyz Republic. http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2007/80715.htm 
2 EBRD Strategy For The Kyrgyz Republic. Approved by 12 June 2007 
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accompanied by marked reductions in banks' interest rates. Between 1998 and 2005, average nominal 
lending rates for all countries fell from 32.9% to 12.9%, while deposit rates dropped from 16.4% to 5.4%. The 
intermediation spread of banks (lending rate minus deposit rate) has been more than halved from 16.5% to 
7.5% on average. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the average lending rate in local currency has been halved from 54% at the beginning of 1998 
to 25.5% at the end of 2006 (the highest level among CIS states), while the deposit rate fell from 37% to 
9.5%. Comparing lending and deposit rates shows however that the intermediation spread on local currency 
funds has remained constant at 17-18%. Some analysts suppose that intermediation spreads are closely 
linked to the low competition in the Kyrgyz banking sector and regulatory requirements. In spite of 
considerable expansion in the range of services rendered by finance and credit institutions, credits are the 
main component of their performing assets. 
Chart 4. Lending (left) and deposit rates (right) in Kyrgyzstan, CIS-7, SEE-3 and CEE-5 
Note: CIS-7 includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan; SEE-3 includes Southeast European 
countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and CEE-5 includes Central and East European countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia 
Source: Author’s calculations, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
Consequently, it is critical to examine the Kyrgyz financial sector and address the obstacles of its 
development that is crucial from the point of view of sustainability of Kyrgyz economic growth. 
Access to medium and long-term finance continues to be severely limited. Deposits in the banking system 
grew from 3.5% of GDP at the end of 2001 to 15% at the end of 2006, reflecting increasing confidence, but 
are still too low to support an expanding private sector. Total loans by commercial banks reached around 
10% of GDP, with 27% over 1 year maturity. Interest rates on loans have gradually been declining, but 
average interest rates as reported by the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR) are at relatively high 
rates (24% in local and 17.5% in foreign currency). 
New empirical analysis suggests that the liberalization of the Kyrgyz financial sector seems to have been 
beneficial to both depositors and borrowers. The presence of foreign controlled banks (the share of foreign 
participation in the authorized capital of commercial banks reached 62.4%) has boosted confidence in the 
banking sector, and therefore, has reduced deposit rates. Moreover, foreign banks charge significantly lower 
lending rates than domestic banks. However, Kyrgyz lending and deposit markets are far from competitive, 
despite the recent restructuring of the sector.  
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ra
te
, %
Kyrgyzstan
CIS-7, average
SEE-3, average
CEE-5, average
0,0
5,0
10,0
15,0
20,0
25,0
30,0
35,0
40,0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ra
te
, %
CIS-7, average
SEE-3, average
CEE-5, average
Kyrgyzstan
CCA Review        July 2007 
 10
Table 1. Summary data on the Kyrgyz banking sector, 2001-2006 (KGS million)3 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total assets 5 029 7 860 11 385 17 703 21 904 28 318 
Total credit 1 557 2 010 2 893 5 801 7 645 11 300 
Total deposits 2 540 3 529 4 781 7 976 12 091 14 976 
GDP 73 883 75 367 83 872 94 351 100 900 113 176 
Credit-deposit ratio (%) 61.3 57.0 60.5 73.3 63.4 75.5 
Share in GDP (%)       
   Total assets 6.8 10.4 13.6 18.8 21.7 25.0 
   Total credit 2.1 2.7 3.4 6.1 7.6 10.0 
   Total deposits 3.4 4.7 5.7 8.5 12.0 13.2 
Yield (%)       
   Return on Assets (ROA) 5.1 5.1 8.8 17.5 17.6 22.4 
   Return on Equity (ROE) 1.4 1.1 1.6 2.5 2.3 3.3 
Exchange Rate (Soms/USD) 48.45 46.94 43.72 42.67 41.01 40.16 
Source: National Bank of The Kyrgyz Republic 
From a private sector perspective, increase in competition among financial institutions should increase 
lending volume, reduce interest rates and lengthen tenors for borrowers. Unfortunately, the recent reduction 
in banking sector concentration does not seem to have increased competition at all.4 The administrative and 
regulatory barriers, high market entry costs reasoned by low confidence and overly segmented banking 
sector are major obstacles for improvement of competition.  
The analysis of banking system structure (market segment occupied by groups of large, medium and small 
banks) shows the reduction of concentration in market shares. Large banks experienced lost of market share 
by 14.7 percentage points to 58.5% from 2004 to 2006 (“large banks” refers to banks, whose share in total 
assets, loans, deposits and capital exceeds 10%, medium banks - from 5% to 10%, and for small banks less 
than 5%). Thus, banks' interest rates have not fully responded to lower market rates, which have been 
brought about by macroeconomic stabilization. 
Non-bank financial organizations, dominated by microfinance institutions and credit unions regulated by the 
NBKR, remain small. Most of them do not have a deposit license and rely on external financing (primarily 
from donors). Credits extended by these institutions amounted to 4-5% of GDP in 2006. 
The need for further banking sector penetration  
The key challenge of developing Kyrgyz financial system is further strengthening of the access to financial 
services which is not only a natural outcome of financial deepening, but also a precondition for economic 
growth. Further development of the financial sector should increase its openness and competitiveness, 
attracting more savings and facilitating investments from both domestic and foreign sources, and easing 
investors’ access to financial resources. There are two main directions of the reforms: recovering public 
confidence in financial intermediaries and improving the quality and efficiency of day-to-day service delivery. 
With the goal of increasing the reliability and stability of the banking system, the NBKR announced that it 
would continue a consistent policy of increasing its capital base, and by the end of 2007, the NBKR 
requirement for banks with respect to the minimum amount of equity capital would be raised to KGS 100 
million. Beginning in 2008, NBKR will begin the placement in operation of supervisory bases for controlling 
                                                 
3 KGS – Som, the national currency of the Kyrgyz Republic 
4 M. Brown, M. Rueda Maurer, T. Pak, N. Tynaev. Banking Sector Reform and Interest Rates in Transition Economies: Bank-Level 
Evidence from Kyrgyzstan. Swiss National Bank Working Papers. February 2007 
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market, transaction, country, and transfer risk. The introduction of a deposit protection system will promote a 
rise of banking penetration that on the one hand will increase the attractiveness of bank deposits for the 
population through their insurance and on the other hand will increase the volume of lending to the 
population through an expansion of commercial banks’ deposit base. The National Bank has developed a 
draft Law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On Protection of Deposits” and an Action Plan for the Introduction of a 
Deposit Protection System, which were proposed for review of the Kyrgyz Parliament in 2007. 
The introduction of this system will depend on its approval by legislative and executive branches of state 
authority. In case of a positive resolution at the end of 2007 and with the start of the formation of the Social 
Fund in 2007-2008, one may project a rise of the receipt of deposits in the banking system from the 
population as early as in this period. 
In view of the importance of agriculture in the Kyrgyz Republic and the relatively high poverty rates in rural 
areas, reforms should emphasize the importance of rural finance development. According to some 
estimates, the current demand for loans is at least USD 300 million, against the delivered USD 54 million. 
One of the steps here is the privatization of the two state-owned banks Aiyl Bank and the Savings and 
Settlement Company, which have the largest branch networks in Kyrgyzstan. 
To mitigate systemic risk to the financial system, especially in light of recent rapid credit growth, policies and 
procedures for risk management process have to be in place. However, risk management in the Kyrgyz 
banking system is almost nonexistent. While many banks have started to enter into new businesses, most 
banks have neither adequate understanding nor capacity to manage risks associated with lending and other 
banking activities, which poses significant risk to the financial system. 
According to the estimations of NBKR, correlation of assets, loans and deposits to GDP in 2010 will exceed 
the levels of 30%, 15% and 20% respectively. It will be higher and better than now but Kyrgyz banking sector 
productivity will remain low in comparison with international standards, and this indicates that there is still 
room for consolidation, cost rationalization and technological progress. In this respect, competition policy that 
fosters bank growth and cost rationalization, for example through mergers and acquisitions and/or the entry 
of first-tier international banks, can help in reducing lending rates and spreads. 
The central bank should undertake active promotional activities that would catalyze the finance sector. There 
is arguably a role for central banks in undertaking short-term activities to promote financial systems able to 
provide households with access to sustainable savings and credit services. These so-called “promotional 
activities” are intended to be a catalyst for private sector activity. They may include support for pilot projects 
using innovative approaches, as well as research, collection and publication of data, advocacy, and training. 
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Factors of economic growth in Georgia 
Nodar Khaduri5  
After a deep recession in the 1990s, the Georgian economy is overcoming its main problems systematically. 
Georgia has performed double-digit growth rates in recent years and has become attractive for foreign 
investors, even if there are still heavy measures needed in order to ensure further development. 
In the process of transition, Georgia is recently realizing significant achievements in economic development. 
The country has slowly but irreversibly left behind the economic recession after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, that was accompanied by internal civil and military opposition unprecedented in former Soviet 
Republics and other post communist countries. 
In comparison with other former planned economies, the first years were extremely difficult for the economy. 
Georgia had to face a number of acute internal problems caused by the separatist movement, civil war and 
the emergence of criminal organizations. Common challenges of other post-communist countries – the 
breakdown of traditional links and relations, absence of own currency and monetary system, governance 
problems, territorial arrangement and defense, among others – exacerbated the situation. 
Brief macroeconomic overview 
Georgia was in chaos in 1991-1993, with all the industry inhibited and other fields of national economy 
coming to a standstill. Crime, military hostilities in Abkhazia, the transport blockade, uncontrolled emission of 
temporary coupons, hyperinflation were the key issues. Because of these, in 1994 the GDP was only quarter 
of its 1989 level. 
That time, Georgia had lived in absence of any far-sighted macroeconomic policy, which was reflected in 
macroeconomic indicators of 1994. According to official statistics, inflation topped 7840% in 1994, real GDP 
decreased by 10.4% in 1994. Around 1.7 million people were employed in the national economy in 1994 that 
is only 56% of labor resources. Besides, the majority of the employed was on unpaid vacations for months. 
These people increased the number of non-visible unemployed.6 Meanwhile, every ‘real’ employed earned 
6.3 million coupons monthly equal to 5 USD, while those employed in the government sector earned 1 USD. 
That practically meant that the Georgian population was doomed to hunger. 
Thanks to the government’s anti-crisis program, economic recession was stopped in 1995 and even a 
modest, 2.6 % growth was achieved. Inflation dropped to 157.4%, from of 7841% in 1994. The country 
gradually started to leave hard times behind. These anti-crisis measures were based on the macroeconomic 
stabilization and sub-system reforms. 
The legal framework of the country's financial system regulating market-based budgetary and monetary 
processes has been developed and adopted. Due to strict monetary policy enforced partly by first financial 
help and conditionality of World Bank and International Monetary Fund7, the National Bank of Georgia 
managed to curb the hyperinflation, which made possible the currency reform (the Russian ruble and USD 
were removed from circulation and a new stable national currency, the Georgian lari was introduced). The 
process of liberalization of prices has practically been completed (the hardest part of which was a release of 
bread prices).  
                                                 
5 Ph.D. in Economics, Professor 
6 These are people who "work", but they had no salary as they were in non-profit vacations for months 
7 World Bank and the IMF granted USD 206 million credit to Georgia in 1995 
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Chart 5. Development of real GDP in its growth period 1995-2008 (%)  
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Source: International Monetary Fund 
A two-tier banking system was formed by delineation of the central banking and commercial banking 
functions. The process of privatization of all former government-owned banks has been completed. 
Full liberalization of external trade has been achieved. Foreign debts and conditions for the servicing were 
rescheduled. Georgia acquired the image of a country that is able to pay back its debts. 
Economic growth reached 10.5% and 10.6%, respectively in 1996 and 1997. The pace of GDP growth 
slowed down in 1998-2000 and reached 2-3%. The decelerating growth caused fiscal mismatch, as the 
growth of budgetary revenues slowed down, while the government was biased to enlarge expenditures in a 
paces of previous years. The possibility to overcome the fiscal imbalance appeared only after the “Rose 
Revolution”.   
Reasons of economic growth 
The record in economic growth was achieved in 2003, when despite the difficult socio-economic situation, 
the economic growth reached almost 11%. In fact, this happened due to one considerable foreign investment 
project – the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline construction and investments in Georgian territory. 
The recent general economic revival started after the “Rose Revolution”. Georgia has become the ground for 
economic reforms after the new government embraced liberal values. The governance became more correct, 
transparent and efficient. The state took active measures to create the necessary environment for business 
development. The privatization process accelerated and the licensing and authorizing procedures were 
simplified. The government also took steps in order to reform taxation and customs. 
Privatization of large establishments has started and the majority of state enterprises turned to private 
property. Their selling prices have sharply increased when foreign investors have become active. It is not 
surprising that Russian and Kazakh investors were the most active actors. Unfortunately, industry has 
received only a little part of the investments. Most of them were made in construction-rehabilitation of travel 
establishments. 
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Free trade is one of the major achievements of the government. The senseless protectionism and introverted 
economic policy became unacceptable. Georgia has become one of the first among post-Soviet countries 
getting the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Regarding the terms taken, the country 
took the responsibility for abolishing customs duties by the year of 2025. However, it has been executed 
since 2006. 
Theoreticians and practical economists consider that the most important hindrance to economic development 
is the government regulation of businesses. The current government is actively implementing the policy of 
“minor governance”. Besides turning away from protectionism and privileges, it gives priority to private 
ownership, restricts the competence of government institutions to those activities, which could not be 
provided by the private sector, and minimizes administrative interference in the economy. 
A tax code was created, according to which the amount of taxes was narrowed (for example motor-road 
benefit taxes, which in its essence were identical to VAT). Revenue and social tax rates were reduced (firstly 
the country transferred from the progressive taxation onto flat income tax rate of 12% from 2004), VAT was 
also moderated (from 20% to 18%). Simultaneously, tax administration and collection strengthened. Because 
of these efforts, tax receipts in the state budget that never exceeded 7% of GDP at previous years, currently 
stand at 20% to GDP. This increase was accompanied with a notable expansion of nominal GDP. 
Unfortunately, there are still difficulties that hinder economic growth. There are external concerns, especially 
from the Russian side. Russia declared economic war against Georgia. Currently there is no transport and 
communications between the countries; even post deliveries are complicated. As for trade, Russia banned 
wine, mineral water, agricultural product imports from Georgia in 2006. Russia also restricted visa issuing, 
ousting thousands of Georgian citizens. 
Additionally, internal problems persist, as private rights are still not sufficiently protected. The government 
and the bureaucracy frequently interfere with business activities, Inflation and unemployment remain severe 
problems: 13% of active population in Georgia is still unemployed, while inflation was close to 10% in 2006. 
Table 2. Development of main macroeconomic aggregates, 2003-2007 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Jan-May 
GDP in market prices (USD mln) 3994.7 5166.3 6415.8 7849.3 - 
GDP per capita (USD) 922.6 1 196.6 1 479.4 1 779.2 - 
Real GDP growth 11.1 5.9 9.6 9.4 11.4 
Consumer price index (%) 7.0 7.5 6.2 8.8 4.3 
Employment (thousand) 1814.5 1783.3 1744.6 - - 
Unemployment rate (%) 11.5 12.6 13.8 - - 
Growth of nominal wages (%) 110.9 124.4 130.4 - - 
Growth of real wages (%) 105.8 117.7 120.5 - - 
Exports (FOB) (USD mln) 465.3 646.9 866.7 992.5 437.8 
Imports (CIF) (USD mln) 1141.1 1847.9 2490.9 3677.8 1852.1 
Trade balance (USD mln) -675.8 -1201.0 -1624.2 -2685.2 -1414.3 
Trade balance to GDP (%) -16.9 -23.4 -25.3 -34.6 - 
Export / import ratio (%) 40.8 35.0 34.8 27.0 23.6 
Official exchange rate (USD/GEL, end of period) 2.0750 1.8250 1.7925 1.7135 1.6780 
Official exchange rate (USD/GEL, period average) 2.1459 1.9168 1.8126 1.7764 1.7025 
Source: National Bank of Georgia, Statistics Georgia 
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Economic growth forecast 
It will certainly be hard to maintain a high rate of GDP growth, but in case of an appropriate economic policy, 
it is likely to remain around 5-7%. The government decided to take measures to curb inflation and overcome 
the unemployment. 
It has to be noted that it is necessary to ensure property rights, prepare and implement the optimal policy and 
more importantly implement optimal monetary and fiscal policy in order to realize optimistic forecast. It has to 
be added that without resuming trade and economic relations with Russia it will be difficult to solve economic 
problems, though the integration line to EU and NATO requires important economic progress. 
Taking into account all the elaborated aspects, nominal GDP will reach GEL 20-22 billion (approximately 
USD 14-15 billion) by 2010. Inflation could be squeezed to 5%, parallel with stable exchange rates. The 
improvement of external economic activity of Georgian enterprises is vital through developed export 
potential. 
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Overall development and the role of competitiveness in Caucasian and 
Central Asian countries 
Tamás Borkó 
Countries of Caucasus and Central Asia used to be treated as economies of similar development level. 
However, their main economic and human development indicators show that all of them are in special 
situation and in unique initial position. This analysis reviews the countries relative position within the region 
using main aggregates of development. Finally, the competitiveness and its main factors are investigated. 
Starting with short historical commemoration, the collapse of the former Soviet Union brought for both 
regions sharp economic decline. During the first five years of transition in the period 1991-1995, all eight 
countries experienced extreme drop in gross domestic product. Only the second half of the nineties could 
show the signs of economic stabilization and revival, seemingly more sustainable paces of growth. 
Achievements of seventeen consecutive years 
However, there is some difference in terms of the setback’s magnitude if comparing Caucasus economies 
with the Central Asian ones. (See Table 3) According to UNECE data, the Caucasian states experienced 
more serious decline. Only in the year 1992, Armenia and Georgia lost more than 40% of its GDP. 
Investigating the data, there are some more conclusions. The economic growth of both regions has started in 
1995-1996, following considerable efforts done in order to establish minimum of operating political and 
economic institutions.  
Table 3. GDP growth in Caucasus and Central Asia, 1991-2006 (%, GDP at prices and PPPs of 2000) 
 AM AZ GE KZ KG TJ TM UZ Caucasus* Central Asia* TOTAL*
1991 -11.7 -0.7 -21.1 -11.0 -7.9 -8.2 -4.7 -0.5 -11.2 -6.5 -8.2
1992 -41.8 -22.6 -44.9 -5.3 -13.8 -32.1 -15.0 -11.1 -36.4 -15.5 -23.3
1993 -8.8 -23.1 -29.3 -9.2 -15.5 -16.3 1.5 -2.3 -20.4 -8.4 -12.9
1994 5.4 -19.7 -10.4 -12.6 -20.1 -21.3 -17.3 -5.2 -8.2 -15.3 -12.7
1995 6.9 -11.8 2.6 -8.2 -5.4 -6.0 -7.2 -0.9 -0.8 -5.5 -3.8
1996 5.9 1.3 11.2 0.5 7.1 -22.5 6.7 1.7 6.1 -1.3 1.5
1997 3.3 5.8 10.5 1.7 9.9 1.7 -11.4 5.2 6.5 1.4 3.3
1998 7.3 10.0 3.1 -1.9 2.1 5.3 7.1 4.4 6.8 3.4 4.7
1999 3.3 7.4 2.9 2.7 3.7 3.7 16.5 4.4 4.5 6.2 5.6
2000 5.9 11.1 1.8 9.8 5.4 8.3 5.5 4.0 6.3 6.6 6.5
2001 9.6 9.9 4.8 13.5 5.3 9.6 4.3 4.5 8.1 7.4 7.7
2002 15.1 10.6 5.5 9.8 0.0 10.8 0.3 4.2 10.4 5.0 7.0
2003 14.0 11.2 11.1 9.3 7.0 11.1 3.3 4.4 12.1 7.0 8.9
2004 10.5 10.2 5.9 9.6 7.0 10.3 4.5 7.7 8.9 7.8 8.2
2005 14.0 26.4 9.6 9.7 -0.2 6.7 9.6 7.0 16.7 6.6 10.4
2006 13.4 34.5 9.4 10.6 2.7 7.0 9,0** 7.3 19.1 6.9 10.6
*arithmetical average **IMF estimate 
Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database 
These disperse performances mean that in 2006 not all of the eight countries were able to reach its GDP 
level of 1990. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are over its 1990’s GDP 
level, while Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan are below. (See Chart 6) 
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Chart 6. Caucasian and Central Asian countries’ GDP in 2006 over 1990 (%)  
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*In calculations 2006 real GDP growth of Turkmenistan is by IMF estimation 
Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database, own calculations 
If analyzing the regional aggregates, both regions and their aggregated total show, that this area has 
reached its economic performance level observed in 1990. However, it is clear that some of the countries are 
still well below the GDP level of the beginning of transition. 
Current relative positions of countries 
By size of economy measured by nominal GDP in current prices according to latest available comparable 
2005 data, one can see that Kazakhstan is the biggest economy in the region, following by Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. The second group consists of Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that all of the mentioned economies are small economies.  (See Table 4.)  
As for more realistic development level, measured by GDP per capita, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are the 
leading group, followed by the Caucasian states. The team of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan lags 
behind. 
Indeed, it is fair to have a look on the positions of countries on the Human Development Ranking (UNDP) 
defined by calculated development indices (HDI). By its latest available 2004 data and ranking, Armenia and 
Kazakhstan take the best places, outpacing the remaining two Caucasian countries. The four not mentioned 
Central Asian states are in the worst position by human development level. 
If comparing the regions, Caucasus produces 44% of Central Asia’s GDP. It is not so bad performance if 
taking into consideration that the population the Caucasus is 27% of Central Asia . Of course, this is reflected 
in GDP per capita data, and additionally in the HDI and its ranking. 
Having a look on some control data, Hungary, as the new member of European Union with around 10 million 
inhabitants produced USD 155.4 billion at internationally comparable prices in 2005, that means USD 15405 
GDP per capita. Ukraine, as also CIS economy, with closed to 47 million population produced USD 290.6 
billion, that corresponds to USD 6193 GDP per capita. This is less than Kazakhstan’s similar per capita 
indicator. 
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Table 4. The main development indicators 
GDP 
(at prices and 
PPPs of 2000, 
USD millions) 
Population 
(thousands)
GDP per 
capita 
(at prices 
and PPPs of 
2000, USD) 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
HDI Ranking 
Country 
2005 2005 2005 2004 2004 
Armenia 13 356 3 016 4 428 0.768 80 
Azerbaijan 36 702 8 392 4 374 0.736 99 
Georgia 14 661 4 361 3 362 0.743 97 
Kazakhstan 104 925 15 147 6 927 0.774 79 
Kyrgyzstan 8 672 5 116 1 695 0.705 110 
Tajikistan 7 765 6 850 1 134 0.652 122 
Turkmenistan 24 492 4 833 5 067 0.724 105 
Uzbekistan 49 000* 26 593 1870* 0.696 113 
Caucasus 64 719 15 769 4104 0.749 92 
Central Asia 145 854 58 539 2492 0.710 106 
TOTAL 210 573 74 308 2834 0.725 101 
*2004 data, own calculation based on estimation of UNDP 
Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database, UNDP 
There is one more interesting momentum concerning economic and human development in the given 
regions, as by available UNDP data Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan do better in 
turning income into education and health opportunities (higher human development), while Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan do worse. All countries inherited close to similar conditions from the Soviet 
era. 
Consequently, Black Sea area and its eight economies mean considerable potential, as its population 
reaches almost 75 million people. This is very similar to Central and Eastern Europe’s 73 million, that 
produced in 2005 USD 2257 billion GDP at comparable prices that is ten times higher. The initial and the 
current conditions are very different, however there can be found good lessons out of experiences of the 
already EU member states.  
Competitiveness, as a key factor of development 
One of the key factors of development is the ability of countries to be competitive, attracting foreign direct 
investments and entering the world economy and its globalization processes. For measuring the 
performance of the investigated countries, the competitiveness indicator of World Economic Forum, the 
Global Competitiveness Index and its main sub-indices are considered. 
According to available data (Table 5), Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have good overall competitiveness 
ranking, even if we know that the performance of these economies is based particularly on fossil fuels. As 
before, Armenia and Georgia represents similar characteristics. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan lags behind, and 
by common sense possibly Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as well. The given indicators reflect however, the 
possible reasons of differences in performances. 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan differ from others considerably in macroeconomic stability (public balance and 
debt, savings, inflation, interest rate spread, real effective exchange rate), infrastructure, business 
sophistication and innovation factors, and in some factors of efficiency enhancers. 
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Table 5. Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) and its ranking 
  Kazakhstan Azerbaijan Armenia Georgia Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan
Rank 56 64 82 85 96 107Global Competitiveness 
Index Score 4,19 4,06 3,75 3,73 3,5 3,31
Rank 51 56 81 82 94 109
I. Basic requirements 
Score 4,64 4,59 4,21 4,2 3,94 3,56
Rank 75 72 84 78 77 123
1. Institutions 
Score 3,59 3,63 3,44 3,51 3,53 2,66
Rank 68 56 92 79 108 103
2. Infrastructure 
Score 3,33 3,67 2,66 2,87 2,2 2,3
Rank 10 17 71 93 96 117
3. Macroeconomy 
Score 5,57 5,3 4,33 4,02 3,94 3,27
Rank 86 96 62 61 85 914. Health and primary 
education Score 6,08 5,76 6,4 6,4 6,09 6,02
Rank 56 78 88 87 103 102
II. Efficiency enhancers 
Score 3,97 3,52 3,33 3,36 3,07 3,08
Rank 51 82 80 76 98 795. Higher education and 
training Score 4,28 3,56 3,58 3,69 3,09 3,6
Rank 44 81 104 86 108 114
6. Market efficiency 
Score 4,39 3,96 3,6 3,86 3,56 3,48
Rank 66 76 86 106 102 122
7. Technological readiness 
Score 3,23 3,03 2,81 2,54 2,57 2,16
Rank 74 70 93 113 103 108
III. Innovation factors 
Score 3,51 3,59 3,17 2,86 3,02 2,93
Rank 72 70 104 116 110 105
8. Business sophistication 
Score 3,9 3,92 3,34 3,02 3,19 3,31
Rank 70 63 84 102 95 111
9. Innovation 
Score 3,13 3,26 3 2,71 2,85 2,55
*data for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are not available 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007 
Tools of development 
Thus, countries lagging behind can step forward in economic and human development by improving their 
transport and telecommunications infrastructure, concentrating on prerequisites of macroeconomic stability, 
ensuring competitive and innovative business environment and legislation. 
For both regions, either for the Caucasus or for Central Asia it is inevitable to invest more into health, primary 
and higher education. The operation and quality of public and private institutions have to get emphasis. 
There is still considerable room for measures in terms of improving innovation potential and market 
efficiency, especially in legislation. 
